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1. INTRODUCTION
Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, which
are important for the safety and performance of nuclear
power plants (NPPs), have been digitalized for the purpose
of the maintenance and precise operation of plants[1]. This
digitalization, however, brings out issues related to cyber
security. In particular, the cases of damage to national critical
infrastructures, including nuclear facilities, owing to cyber
attacks that passed over air gaps between the facility and
the outside, have raised immediate needs for cyber security
measures. As a response to this, many nuclear industries
have isolated their I&C systems from the networks con-
nected to the internet.
For the cyber security of NPP I&C systems, many
regulatory requirement documents[2,3,4], the IAEA guide
NSS-17[5], the IEEE Standard 7-4.3.2 [6] were already
published, while the IEC standards are undergoing a pre-
paratory phase. There are many documents addressing
cyber security of industrial control systems (ICSs) as well
as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems [7~13]. Many of these documents focus on network
security, since these systems commonly have connections
with corporate business networks. In the cyber security
domain, NPP I&C systems tend to be addressed from the
viewpoint of ICS and SCADA systems. NPP I&C systems,
however, have characteristics different from ICS and
SCADA systems [14~16]., Safety regulations for NPP
I&C systems require limitations in data communications
between safety systems and non-safety systems, defense-
in-depth and diversity, and rigorous hardware and software
qualification including verification and validation, safety
analysis, and configuration management. These safety
regulation requirements already address some requirements
for cyber security. Hence, NPP I&C system designers may
encounter difficulties when trying to satisfy the newly issued
cyber security requirements, while identifying additional
design features and where and how to apply those to their
systems.  
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Methods for cyber security risk and vulnerability as-
sessments, have been studied recently by international
standard organizations, regualtory institutes, and research
institutes. Among these, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) risk assessment method, proposed
in NIST 800-82[9], NIST 800-53[17] and NIST 800-30[18],
can be considered as a representative case. Overall system
characteristics including cyber threat cases are analyzed,
and the possibility of malicious behaviour exploiting system
vulnerabilities is then evaluated in this method. Based on
assessments of availability, integrity, and confidentiality,
especially through likelihood determination and impact
analyses, risks owing to system vulnerabilities are rated at
three levels of severity. For the IT systems, confidentiality
and integrity are addressed more importantly than avail-
ability in risk assessments. When applying this method to
the I&C systems in NPPs, the quantification or rating of
risks may be inappropriate and hard to validate, since how
and to what extent risks affect the system safety and avail-
ability cannot be assessed simply as in the IT systems.
The U.S. NRC published the Regulatory Guide 5.71
(RG 5.71)[3] for the cyber security of new and operating
NPPs, and the IAEA issued NSS-17[5] as a technical
guidance for computer security at nuclear facilities. These
documents provide general approaches and guidance for
the cyber security of I&C systems, including cyber security
plans and programs, methods for cyber security assess-
ments, and a comprehensive set of security controls. How-
ever, there are still difficulties from the system designer’s
point of view when it comes to decision making about
which technical controls to which parts of the target I&C
systems need to be applied. Practical examples for the
application of technical security controls have not been
available to the system designers, leading to difficulties
when defining appropriate security control requirements
and security design features for the individual I&C systems.
In a previous study [19], a cyber security risk assessment
method for the design and development of I&C systems
in NPPs was proposed. The method describes an assessment
process specified in detail for NPP I&C systems, which
consists of a series of steps, including system identification,
security modeling, analysis of effects on critical digital assets
(CDAs), threat analysis, vunlerability analysis, security
control design, and penetration tests. Through this process,
potential system vulnerabilities and protection measures can
be identified. This approach, based on the basic under-
standing of NPP I&C systems, presents a way to define
cyber security measures that are appropriate for a target
I&C system. 
This paper follows the assessment process introduced
in the previous study, and addresses further studies related
to an analysis of vulnerability and to the methods for the
selecttion and application of the cyber security requirements
and technical security controls presented in RG 5.71. In
order to provide information helpful for system designers
in the application of cyber security requirements to their
systems, this paper describes methods and considerations
to define attack vectors in a target system, to review and
select the requirements in the RG 5.71, and to integrate the
results to identify applicable technical security controls. 
2. METHODS
The RG 5.71 provides the most complete set of require-
ments for NPP I&C system designers to identify security
design features and apply them to their I&C systems. RG
5.71 addresses various cyber security assessment activities
and presents a series of requirements for security controls.
To determine which control requirements are applied to
which part of the system, the system designers should
analyze the systems and perform cyber security assessment
activities in accordance with the guidance in RG 5.71.
However, example cases of these activities, from which they
can obtain information on how to conduct the activities,
are not yet available publicly. In this study, to provide
detailed guidance helpful to system designers, analyses on
attack vectors were performed, and cyber security require-
ments applicable to specific CDAs in I&C systems were
identified.
2.1 Analysis of Attack Vectors 
“An attack vector is a path or means by which a hacker
can gain access to a computer or network server in order
to deliver a payload or malicious outcome. Attack vectors
enable hackers to exploit system vulnerabilities, including
the human element[20].” Attack vectors on an I&C system
may include attack entry points for code injection or other
cyber attacks, such as CDAs, networks, and portable de-
vices or media that can be attached to CDAs, as well as
their vulnerabilities. Attack vectors can be identified through
analyses of system architecture, properties of CDAs, and
possible cyber threats to the system, together with pene-
tration tests. As the first step to narrow down the applicable
cyber security requirements, the following activities are
performed in this study:
1)Analysis of an I&C system architecture at the highest
conceptual level; 
2)Modeling of a target system from a cyber security point
of view; 
3)Security level assignments to the CDAs of a target
system;
4)Analysis of the elements of attack vectors based on the
cyber security model of the system;
5) Investigation of the known vulnerabilties residing in
the CDAs and penetration tests to identify potential
malicious activities.
2.1.1 Analysis of an I&C System Architecture
ICSs are connected in general to off-site corporate
business systems or the Internet. For the cyber security of
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network connections bewteen the ICS and the outer systems,
many NIST documents, including NIST SP800-82 and
NIST SP 800-53, describe the measures to be applied. In
Korean NPPs, I&C systems have been isolated from the
outside after the Stuxnet incident. This study was performed
based on an assumption that the I&C systems already main-
tain air gaps.
At the highest conceptual level, NPP I&C systems can
be categorized by safety systems and non-safety systems
as shown in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 also illustrates the network con-
nections between the two systems. Safety systems can
transmit data to non-safety systems, but a data transmission
in the reverse direction is not allowed by nuclear safety
regulations and requirements. Defense-in-depth require-
ments in RG 5.71 specify very similar conditions in which
data transmission from CDAs at lower security levels to
those at higher security levels are not recommended. These
security requirements can be met naturally by assigning
security levels to CDAs in accordance with their safety
classes.
Because of the isolated network architecture, it is hard
to compromise CDAs of I&C systems from the outside
by the use of active cyber attack methods. During NPP
maintenance and test activities, however, external digital
devices or media can be connected to the CDAs and may
provide a path to passive cyber attacks such as advanced
persistent threats (APTs). For this reason, digital devices
for maintenance, calibration, and tests of I&C systems,
should be included in the scope of cyber security assess-
ments during the operation phase of plants.
2.1.2 Security Modeling of Target Systems 
Security modeling is a way to simplify the functions,
roles, service types, and data communications of target
systems for an effective security requirement analysis. In
this modeling, as noted in our previous paper [19], any
system configuration for redundancy may be simplified as
a single train. Signal lines from sensors, analog input/output,
digital input/output, and one-to-one direct data commu-
nication can be excluded or simplified. All kinds of CDAs
and data transfer directions and mechanisms within the
target systems, should be identified and included in the
model. After the analysis of security requirements and
technical security controls with this security model, the
resultant security controls can be applied to the original
systems at the locations corresponding to those in the model.
In this study, a plant protection system (PPS) was se-
lected as an example target system. The PPS, based on
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), has four channels.
For a security model of this system, the four channels were
simplified into one channel and analog lines are excluded
as shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, the bistable processor (BP),
coincidence processor (CP), and interface and test processor
(ITP) are safety-grade PLCs, and the maintenance and test
Fig. 1. Conceptual Data Flow Architecture of NPP I&C
Systems (Redrawn from Ref. [16])
Fig. 2. Data Flow Model of PPS for Cyber Security Analysis
panel (MTP) is an industrial PC. The information process-
ing system (IPS) is a server computer system, and the oper-
ator module (OM) is a safety-grade industrial PC installed
in the main control room.
The BP transfers signals to the PLCs of other PPS chan-
nels, and similarly, the CP does so to the PLCs of another
safety system (ESF-CCS: Engineered Safety Features-
Component Control System). This communication in BP
and CP is one-directional. For data transmission within the
same channel, N-to-N type intra-channel network commun-
ications are used. Also, the BP and CP transfer information
to each other directly through a P-to-P type safety data
link. The MTP collects some information from the PLCs
through the intra-channel network, then transfers these to
the IPS through a one-directional Ethernet network and to
the OM through the intra-channel network. For the mainte-
nance and tests of PLCs, a laptop computer (EWS: Engin-
nering Work Station) may be connected to each PLC.
Table 1 lists data transmission networks and their types
used in the PPS.
2.1.3 Security Level Assignments 
Security level assignments are needed to apply a de-
fense-in-depth strategy to a cyber security design of I&C
systems to effectively protect CDAs from cyber attacks.
The NIST SP 800-53[17] and IAEA technical guidance[5]
recommend a graded approach in which security controls
in several grades are applied to CDAs according to their
assigned security levels. In contrast, in the NEI 04-04 Revi-
sion 1 [21] and RG 5.71 [3], security levels in the defense-
in-depth strategy define only the limitations of data trans-
mission, but differentiation of the grades of security controls
is not addressed. These two documents state that CDAs for
safety, important-to-safety, security, or control functions
are assigned to security level 4, and CDAs for data acqui-
sition functions to security level 3. In agreement with this,
CDAs or systems related to plant safety or plant shutdown
are assigned to security level 4 as shown in Fig. 3 in this
study. CDAs or systems not related to plant shutdown,
but connected to CDAs at level 4 through networks, are
allocated to security level 3. Most NPP I&C systems are
allocated to either security level 4 or security level 3. 
Based on this argument, for the sample PPS, the security
levels of the CDAs in Fig. 2 are assigned as in Table 2.
2.1.4. Analysis of the Elements of Attack Vectors
This analysis identified CDAs, which can be infected
by malware from outside of the system, or at which any
malicious activities can occur. It then estimates how the
infection or the activities become possible. It is important
in this analysis that all digital equipment and media for
the maintenance and tests should be addressed, and users
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Data transmission Network type
BP to the PLCs in other PPS channels
BP to CP
CP to ESF-CCS
BP, CP, ITP to EWS
BP, CP, ITP, MTP to Intra-channel Network
MTP to IPS
OM to Intra-channel Network
P to P (data diodes)
P to P (data diodes)
P to P (data diodes)
Serial 
N to N
Ethernet
N to N
Table 1. Network Types used for the PPS 
CDA Assigned Security Level
BP
CP
ITP
MTP
OM
IPS
EWS
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
Table 2. Security Levels Assigned to the PPS Components
Fig. 3. Security Level Assignment Scheme
of them and corresponding task procedures should be
reviewed.  
In Fig. 3, for the sample PPS, safety grade PLCs such
as BP, CP, and ITP are at the highest security level., Based
on the assumption in this study that the safety PLCs are not
infected during manufacturing and delivering phases, only
one track path from the outside can be expected through
the EWS being connected to the PLCs during the mainte-
nance and tests of them,. Since the EWS communicates
with each of the PLCs, the EWS can be an entry point of
cyber attacks. If the EWS accept the use of external media
such as USB flash drives, the external media can become
additional attack entry points. Therefore, it is evident that
an attack vector to a PLC can be formed through the EWS. 
At least two types of cyber attacks can be anticipated
here. One affects a PLC directly causing it to malfunction,
another installs malware into a PLC to expand infections to
other CDAs in the system. The latter is much more elaborate,
and may affect not only the infected CDA but also the whole
system. Additionally, it can be anticipated from Fig. 3 that
some manipulated information from the EWS can be trans-
mitted to the BP and other PLCs or the MTP, and at last
to IPS through the information networks. Information on
the IPS will be displayed to the operators in the main control
room so that they may judge the plant state incorrectly.
Based on this discussion of potential malicious attacks,
the following major attack entry points, providing a path
to attack vectors, can be identified in general I&C systems:
Network: Malware or malicious activities can be ex-
panded to CDAs through networks; 
User: Users may access CDAs for operation, mainte-
nance, and tests. Since users can conduct malicious
activities directly to CDAs, suitable security controls
for their access, authentication, and accountability will
be necessary;
External Device: The external devices or systems used
for the maintenance and tests are subjects for the analy-
sis. The external devices connected to CDAs can modify
or delete the programs residing in the CDAs. Since
external devices, for example, laptops for the mainte-
nance of I&C system are portable in general, they should
be treated as critical elements providing attack vectors;
and 
External Media: External media are the elements that
can be connected to CDAs directly or indirectly through
external devices. External media are able to access to
industrial PCs or other computing devices to transfer
and execute malicious code to modify system software
or cause the systems malfunction. They can also be used
to modify or delete the installed programs, or install
abormal code. According to the capability to read and
write, external media are categorized into read and write
media, such as USB flash drives and hard disk drives,
and read-only media, such as compact discs and DVDs. 
In accordance with these elements of attack entry points,
the following attack vectors affecing a target CDA can be
defined; 
Other CDAs to CDA: This implies that other CDAs
connected to a target CDA and infected by malware or
affected by malicious activities can expand the infection
or malicious activities to the target CDA; 
User to CDA: A hacker can access and attack a target
CDA directly;
External Device to CDA: An external device is connect-
ed to a target CDA, and hence it can infect malware
or conduct malicious activities to the CDA; 
External Media to CDA: External media can access a
target CDA, and hence they can infect malware or
conduct malicious activities to the CDA; 
User to CDA through External Device: A hacker can
conduct cyber attacks to a target CDA by accessing
an external device; and
External Media to CDA through External Device: A
hacker could use external media to attack a target CDA
through an external device to which the external media
are connected.
Fig. 4 shows the elements of attack vectors discussed
here.
2.1.5 Investigation of known Vulnerabilties and
Penetration Tests
Based on the analysis of attack vectors, a vulnerability
analysis and penetration tests are performed to identify the
malicious activities that can compromise the target system.
To identify the kind of cyber attacks that are possible for
a target system, vulnerabilities for the CDAs composing
a target system should first be investigated. Vulnerabilities
already residing in systems can be exploited easily by
hackers. Hence, it is important to investigate the known
vulerabilities and determine their exploitability. Results
from this analysis can be ascertained by performing pene-
tration tests with a test-bed. 
As noted in NIST 800-82 [22], there can be a potential
for a disruption of the system when penetration tests are
conducted. In this study, a test-bed consisting of one set of
BP, CP, ITP, MTP, and OM is constructed for the pene-
tration tests of the sample PPS. Analyses, based on this test-
bed, are performed with regard to what kinds of cyber at-
tacks are possible and which measures can protect CDAs
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Fig. 4. Elements of Attack Vectors to a Target CDA
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against the attacks, by investigating the known vulnerabil-
ities, the types of attacks exploiting the vulnerabilities, and
their impact to the CDAs or on the system.
2.1.5.1 Analysis of known Vulnerabilities
The Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) [23]
are helpful in collecting the known vulnerabilities. The
CVEcontains detailed information about the types of vul-
nerabilities, as well as the kinds of attack and loss types
possible due to these vulnerabilities. It also provides web
site information which is the source of detailed information.
The information collected through the CVE, it is possible
to analyze which systems may suffer from what kind of
damages, and how high the risk will be. The information
from this analysis is important to grasp the possibility of
exploiting vulnerabilities and the level of resultant damages
before the penetration tests.
Vulnerabilities for the operating system (OS), applica-
tions, and network of sample PPS were searched at the CVE,
and those for only the OS were found. Table 3 presents
the vulnerabilities searched for the OS in the test-bed for
PPS and their impact. With the impact data in this table, it
is possible to identify of the possible kinds of cyber attacks,
in turn, this identification notifies the types of attacks that
may be exercised during the penetration testings to verify
the impact. In Table 3, “Local Exploit” in the column “Type”
means that the attacks should take place at the installed
location of PPS to compromise the system with those in
“Impact.”
The results from these analyses may be used to define
technical security measures to eliminate or restirict the
known vulnerabilities. In relation to these measures, the
requirements in C.7 Defense-in-Depth of the RG 5.71,
“devices are free from known malicious code,” and in C.
12.5 Developer Security Testing, “known insecure software
components or libraries” should be considered.
2.1.5.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Maintenance Devices 
It is also important to determine if the CDAs have the
vulnerabilities exploitable by cyber attacks from the EWS,
by identifying and analyzing local exploit vulnerabilities
for attacking inside the system and their potential impact.
It should be considered that a code for attacking inside
the system from the EWS can be developed to exploit the
known vulnerabilities of CDAs.
It is necessary to analyze the vulnerabilities of all digital
assets that can affect the CDAs in the development environ-
ment as well as in a target system. Maintenance devices
such as EWS are identified in section 2.1.4 as major attack
entry points. During the development phase, the EWS is
usually put in the same environment as the target system,
and also has a possibility to be handled with less caution
than the target system. It is important to identify and respond
to potential threats from those devices. In detail, the possible
threats and their effects from maintenance devices should
be analyzed in consideration of the problems that may exist
in those devices, such as ‘Insecure network /Internet access,’
‘Insecure movable device use,’ and ‘Insecure configuration
of System.’ Measures against cyber threats from the mainte-
nance devices should be defined by performing the identifi-
cation of types of threats to target CDAs, conditions enabling
the threats and the consequences of the threats to take place,.
In this study for the sample PPS, it is assumed that the
EWS for PPS PLCs is managed under a flexible security
Table 3. Target System Vulnerabilities Searched from the CVE
Operating 
System
QNX
Neutrino
RTOS 6.x
Private
OS
-
Category
Not-Fix
Vulnerabilities
QNX insecure permissions
QNX RTOS "inputtrap" Information Disclosure Vulnerability
QNX RTOS "crrtrap" Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
QNX reveals content of clipboard
QNX Neutrino RTOS Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities
QNX RTOS "dhcp.client" File Permission Weakness
QNX RTOS local DoS
QNX RTOS phgrafx Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
QNX RTOS FTP Client "QUOTE" Command Format String
Vulnerability
QNX privilege escalation
N/A
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
Local Exploit
-
Local Exploit
Privilege Escalation DoS
Exposure of sensitive information
Privilege Escalation
Exposure of sensitive information
Privilege Escalation
DoS
DoS
Privilege Escalation
Privilege Escalation
-
Privilege Escalatio
Type Impact
environment, and has the same configuration as general
IT devices that may be connected intermittently to outside
networks. Possible threats under the specific conditions of
the EWS and their results are identified. Table 4 shows
the results of this identification performed with the EWS
for PPS PLCs.
An ‘Insecure network’ in this table can be treated with
the requirements for B.1 Access Control, especially B.1.18
Insecure and Rogue Connections of RG 5.71 Appendix B,
and ‘insecure movable device use’ with those in C.7 De-
fense-in-Depth and B.1.16 Open/Insecure Protocol Restric-
tions.
2.1.5.3 Analysis of Malicious Activities through
Penetration Tests
Malicious activities that can take place in the CDAs
and systems and their consequences can be evaluated in
detail through penetration tests, which are performed on
a test-bed based on the information from the analyses of
attack vectors and vulnerabilities. Penetration tests, in this
case, are to confirm the results from the previous analyses
and verify the consequences of malicious activities. The
results from these tests will help to define suitable security
measures to protect the system from the malicious activities.
Penetration tests can also be performed after the implemen-
tation of technical security controls into a target system
to verify their effectiveness. 
For the penetration tests with the test-bed, two attack
vectors are defined, based on the discussion in section
2.1.4 and the vulnerability analyses in sections 2.1.5.2 and
2.1.5.3. Attack vector 1 starting from the EWS to a PLC
and further to other CDAs in the system, and attack vector
2 from users to the MTP and to the sysem are defined. Fig.
5 shows these attack vectors in the test-bed. In the pene-
tration tests, to identify malicious activities and their impact
on the CDAs and throughout the whole system, conditions
such as malware implementation, successful remote exploi-
tation, and non-validated code execution are tested and
possible malicious activities under these conditions are
investigated.
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Table 4. Vulnerability Assessment Results for the EWS
Entry
EWS
Condition
Insecure network /Internet Access
Insecure movable device use
Misconfigured network
Insecure configuration of system
Reverse Shell execution
Malware Implementation
System Compromise
System Compromise
Malware implementation
System Compromise
System Compromise
Vulnerability Exploit
Malware Implementation
Threats
Client Side Attack by XSS, Pishing, Java
Deserialization
Malware Attack
Malware Attack
Network Attack from other insecure Hosts
Firewall Bypass
Results
Fig. 5. Attack Vectors on the PPS Test-bed.
As the results of penetration tests, Table 5 shows pos-
sible malicious activities and the conditions required for
initiating the malicious activities. Security measures elimi-
nating the conditions can be identified and applied in order
for the corresponding malicious activities not to take place.
Technical security control requirements in accordance
with the malicious activities identified in this way can be
treated with the requirements in the RG 5.71. In detail,
B.3.4 Denial of Service Protection for ‘DoS attack,’ B.5.2
Host Intrusion Detection System for ‘illegal task create,’
and B.1.4 Information Flow Enforcement for ‘packet
modification’ should be considered.
2.2 Analysis of Technical Security Control Require-
ments in RG 5.71
The RG 5.71 contains a comprehensive set of security
control requirements that should be applied to NPP I&C
systems to protect them against cyber attacks. The RG 5.71
Appendix B contains°∞Technical Security Controls,” and
Appendix C lists “Operational and Management Security
Controls.” Appendix B lists requirements that are not con-
sidered as technical control requirements, and Appendix
C includes some requirements that should be regarded as
technical control requirements designed and implemented
during the development of I&C systems. Therefore, it is
necessary to review the requirements carefully for their
applicability to the I&C systems. 
2.2.1 Selection of Technical Control Requirements
Some parts of the technical security control requirements
address security policy or procedures, which are not neces-
sary for the design of security features to be implemented
into the I&C systems. These will be excluded in this review.
Also, the requirements that can be applicable to a general
IT environment, but not appropriate to NPP I&C systems
(e.g., Automated Marking), and those that are already incor-
porated into the I&C system design inherently as a part
of development activities of safety systems, e.g., system
verification and validation, can also be excluded. During
this review, every sentence in the requirement descriptions
should be evaluated, and in some cases, even a sentence
may be separated into several items. 
These criteria are also applicable when reviewing the
requirements in Appendix C. There are requirements that
can be regarded as technical security control requirements,
for example, Malicious Code Protection, Monitoring Tools
and Techniques, Information Input Restrictions, Mainte-
nance Tools, Error Handling, Defense-in-Depth, Recovery
and Reconstitution, Configuration Settings, Component
Inventory, and Developer Security Testing.
Table 6 below lists examples that are excluded or limit-
ted in its application for a review of the requirements in
Appendix B, and table 7 presents example requirements in
Appendix C which can be regarded as technical security
control requirements.
2.2.2 Use of Vulnerability Analyses and Penetration
Tests
The requirements selected as in the previous section
should be evaluated individually for their applicability and
effects on the target I&C systems. If all the requirements
are incorporated into the systems, there must be adverse
effects on the function or performance of systems. Also,
individual technical security control requirements that
are selected to achieve the security of a CDA may result
in duplication for the same security purpose. There is a
possiblity that the cost will increase enormously if security
control requirements derived from service-oriented IT
systems are applied to safety and reliability centered NPP
I&C systems. For example, if security controls, such as a
real-time access control for device-to-device identification,
authentication, authorization, and data encryption, may be
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Table 5. Analysis of Malicious Activities of the Potential Attack Vectors
Attack vector 1
Attack vector 2
Potential attack vector
DoS attack 
Network Scan (port, service etc) 
Network Sniffing 
Packet Modification 
Local Exploit to Escalate Privilege 
Improper Command Execution
Local Exploit to Escalate Privilege 
DoS attack through Serial 
Key Logging 
Illegal Command Execution through Serials
Illegal Task Create 
Processor Resource Exhaust Attack
Conditions
Malware Implementation 
Successful, 
Reverse Shell execution
Malware Implementation
Successful
Non-validate code Exploit
Vulnerability Exploit
Malicious activities
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Table 6. Example Requirements in Appendix B not Considered as Technical Control Requirements
1. Account Management
Titles of Control
Requirements
“managing and documenting CDA
accounts” are related to operation and
management controls
Requirements
Managing and documenting CDA accounts, including
authorizing, establishing, activating, modifying, reviewing,
disabling, and removing accounts
2. Account Management
“reviewing and documenting CDA
accounts” are related to operation and
management controls
Reviewing and documenting CDA accounts at a maximum
interval consistent with the most recent version of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 03-12 [24], “Security Plan, Training
and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan,”
endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
3. Unsuccessful Login 
Attempts
Limitted application to safety systems.
Applicable to the systems that need login.
Seek alternative controls if real time
alerting is impossible.
Real time alerting of designated personnel with the security
expertise for the CDA through alarms when the number of
defined consecutive invalid access attempts is exceeded.
4. Auditable Events
Automated auditable event logging is
important. It is better not to take
alternatives easy.  
Implementing alternative controls and documenting the
justification for alternative controls and countermeasures for
situations in which a CDA cannot support the use of
automated mechanisms to generate audit records and employs
non-automated mechanisms and procedures
5. Secure Name/Address
Resolution Service
(Authoritative/Truste
d Source)
Normal practice during system design or
implementation
Configuring systems that provide name/address resolution to
CDAs, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical
namespace, to provide the means to indicate the security
status of child subspaces and, if the child supports secure
resolution services, enabled verification of a chain of trust
among parent and child domains.
6. Removal of
Unnecessary Services
and Programs
Normal practice during system design or
implementation
Documents all required applications, utilities, system
services, scripts, configuration files, databases, and other
software and the appropriate configurations, including
revisions or patch levels, for each of the computer systems
associated with the CDAs.
Reason for Exclusion or Limitation in
Application
Table 7. Example Requirements in Appendix C to be Treated as Technical Controls
1. Error Handling
Titles of Control
Requirements
Should be implemented into the system
Requirements
Error conditions are identified, Error messages are revealed
only to authorized personnel.
2. Defense-in-Depth Should be considered during system design.Omitted
3. Incident Monitoring Automated mechanisms should be
implemented into the system.
[Licensee/Applicant] tracks and documents security incidents
on an ongoing basis using automated mechanisms to assist in
the tracking of security incidents and in the collection and
analysis of incident information.
4. CDA Backups
Function for “protecting system backup
information” may be implemented into the
system.
Backing up CDAs at an interval identified for the CDA or
based on trigger events, protecting system backup
information from unauthorized modification
5. Developer Security
Testing
Should be considered during system
implementation.
The static source code vulnerability analysis performed to
inspect the developed code for potential security defects, poor
programming practices, hidden functions, and vulnerable
features within the code during the implementation of the
code base and methods applied to eliminate these
vulnerabilities
Reason for Inclusion
applied to safety systems, it is evident that the availability
of the systems will be adversely affected. As indicated in
this argument, security controls should be applied to the
systems with caution by analyzing if there are no adverse
impacts during the implementation of the controls into the
systems. There may be some limitations dependent on the
target system when applying technical security control
requirements. In cases of safety systems, which do not use
general IT devices, the direct application of technical security
controls to the CDAs will be very restricted. Critical security
requirements with high priorities should be identified first
through the vulnerability analyses and penetration tests, to
assess the security requirements in a more objective way.
Security measures are identified to protect CDAs against
the malicious activities resulting from the vulnerability
analyses and penetration test in section 2.1.5. Table 8 shows
these measures, and Fig. 6 shows the arrangement of these
measures for the PPS security model.
As shown in Table 8 and Fig. 6 above, it is identified
that access control, monitoring & logging, and encryption
are the most critical technical security controls for the PPS.
These security controls are general for safety systems,
since the components and structures of the other safety
systems are similar to the PPS, and can also be extended
to non-safety systems because they have attack vectors
similar to the PPS case. 
Access Control: For both safety and non-safety systems,
identification and authentication, system and data
restrictions, system use notification, domain, session,
portable and mobile media, unauthorized access and
use, communications access, etc.
Monitoring & Logging: Monitoring and analyzing
conditions for both safety and non-safety systems.
Encryption: Network and data encrtyption mainly for
non-safety systems.
Based on this argument, the requirements selected as
in section 2.2.1 can be classified into four groups including
access control, monitoring and logging, encryption, and
others. Table 9 lists the titles of the technical security control
requirement in the RG 5.71 selected as in section 2.2.1 and
classified in four groups. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To define applicable technical security requirements,
attack vectors described in section 2.1 and technical require-
ments analysis in section 2.2 are integrated. Attack vectors
in Fig. 4 need to be refined in more detail in accordance
with the analysis of the requirements. Fig. 7 shows the
results from this refinement. Among digital devices for the
maintenance and tests, there can be non-authenticatable
ones such as a digital tester. Although these devices do not
have an authentication function, they may allow the use
646 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
SONG et al., An Analysis of Technical Security Control Requirements for Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants
Malicious activities
DoS attack
Technical security measures
Network Monitoring
Network Scan (port, service
etc), Network Sniffing
Network/Host Monitoring
Packet Modification
Network/Host Monitoring,
Encryption
Local Exploit to Escalate
Privilege
Host Monitoring, Access Control
Improper or Illegal
Command Execution
Access Control
Processor Resource Exhaust
Attack
Network/Host Monitoring,
Table 8. Security Measures Against the Malicious Activities
Drawn in Section 2.1.5 for the PPS
Fig. 6. Security Measure Arrangement for PPS
of external media for data loading and backup purposes.
Another point to consider in the identification of applicable
requirements is that there are two different kinds of external
media. A group of external media such as USB flash drives
and HDDs has a read and write capability, and another
group such as CD and DVD is read-only. According to
this capability, applicable security requirements will be
different from each other.
Where to apply the requirements grouped in Table 9
can be evaluated with the attack vectors in Fig. 7. The
requirements are reviewed for the following elements:
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Table 9. Titles of Technical Security Control Requirements Selected for the PPS and Classified in four Groups
Access Control
(Appendix B)
• Access Control Policy and
Procedures
• Access Control Policy and
Procedures
• Account Management
• Application Partitioning and
Security Function Isolation
• Authenticator Feedback
• Device Identification and
Authentication
• Hardware Configuration
• Identification and
Authentication Policies and
Procedures
• Nonauthenticated Human
Machine Interaction Security
• Password Requirements
• Previous Logon Notification
• Session Authenticity
• Session Lock
• Trusted Path
• Unauthorized Remote
Activation of Services
• Unsuccessful Login Attempts
• Use of External Systems
• User Identification and
Authentication
(Appendix C)
• Defense-in-Depth
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Media Access
(Appendix B)
• Audit Generation
• Audit Reduction and Report
Generation
• Audit Review, Analysis, and
Reporting
• Audit Storage Capacity
• Auditable Events
• Changes to File System and
Operating System
• Content of Audit Records
• Denial of Service Protection
• Fail in Known State
• Hardware Configuration
• Host Intrusion Detection
System
• Information Flow Enforcement
• Mobile Code
• Proprietary Protocol Visibility
• Protection of Audit Information
• Removal of Unnecessary
Services and Programs
• Response to Audit Processing
Failures
• Secure Name/Address
Resolution Service
(Authoritative/Trusted Source)
• System Use Notification
Permissions
• Time Stamps
(Appendix C)
• Defense-in-Depth
• Developer Security Testing
• Error Handling
• Incident Moniotoring
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Malicious Code Protection
• Monitoring Tools and
Techniques
(Appendix B)
• CDA Backups
• Confidentiality of
Information at Rest
• Cryptographic Key
Establishment and
Management
• Cryptographic Module
Authentication
• Information Flow
Enforcement
• Transmission Confidentiality
• Transmission Integrity
• Use of Cryptography
(Appendix B)
• Authenticator Management
• Changes to File System and
Operating System Permissions
• Identifier Management
• Insecure and Rogue
Connections
• Installing Operating Systems,
Applications, and Third-Party
Software Updates
• Least Privilege
• Network Access Control
• “Open/Insecure” Protocol
Restrictions
• Public Key Infrastructure
Certificates
• Separation of Functions
• Shared Resources
• Supervision and Review—
Access Control
• Third Party Products and
Controls
Monitoring & Logging Encryption Others
Fig. 7. Refined Attack Vectors 
User to CDA: The requirements for access controls
should be considered. Those for monitoring and logging
may in part be applicable to the record information
on users’ access to the CDA, if the CDA provides that
logging function. Encryption requirements may be
applied in part to a function handling user input for
access controls. This can be dependent on the capability
of CDA. 
External Devices (Authenticatable) to CDA : When
external devices are connected to the CDA, the require-
ments of the access control should be considered. At
least either the external devices or the CDA, which can
process the authentication and recording the related
information, should have security functions for access
control and logging. The requirements for monitoring
the data transmission along this path can be applied,
if possible. Encryption of data transmitted between
digital devices may not be necessary, if man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attacks are not possible. 
External Media to the CDA: The requirements for access
control should be considered, if external media may be
connected to the CDA. The CDA should have functions
of access control and real-time monitoring of data
transmission, if this is not possible, the media record
the history of access and data transmission. There can
be access control provisions in both the media and the
CDA. Encryption may not be needed here.
External Media to External Device (Authenticatable):
The requirements for access control and monitoring
should be considered, at least for the items such as
automated access control and management, monitoring,
device identification, and error handling. Encryption
may not be needed here.
External Device (Non-Authenticatable) to CDA: In
most cases, both devices cannot implement security
functions, hence, device user, device identification, and
related user tasks may be recorded manually. This is
rather related to the security policy or management
controls.
External Media to External Devices (Non-Authen-
ticatable): This may not be allowed in NPPs. But if
any, operation and management controls similar to
External Device (Non-Authenticatable) to CDA can
be applied.
Other CDAs to a target CDA: Data transfer between
CDAs occur through networks. The newtwork archi-
tecture can be reviewed with the defense-in-depth
requirements. Monitoring and logging for the data
transmission should be considered. Access controls
are very difficult to apply here, since there must be
adverse impact to the function of CDAs. Encryption
may bring similar impact, but for the non-safety systems,
data storage servers and netwroks may consider the
application of encryption. 
User to External Devices (Authenticatable): This can
be treated similar to User to CDA. The requirements
for access control and monitoring and logging should
be considered in the external devices.
RG 5.71 requires that security controls should not cause
any adverse impact on the safety function and performance
of CDAs. If a security control requirement belongs to this
category, alternative control requirements should be consid-
ered. For example in cases where, it may not be easy to
implement real-time authentication functions for safety-
grade PLCs. There are many cases addressing both basic
requirements for technical security controls and alternatives
in RG 5.71. In these cases, the alternatives address physical
and/or management control requirements in general, and
the basic requirements for technical security controls will
be better than the alternatives for the security purpose. The
alternatives may be considered, only if a specific security
control requirement cannot be implemented because of
the adverse impact.
The main purpose of encryption is to protect CDAs
against man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. This may not
be an effective form of control for safety systems, since
MitM attacks are hard to expect in the environment where
the safety systems are placed. The non-safety systems,
which have computer systems and networks similar to
industrial control systems or general IT systems, may
consider the application of encryption for the confidentiality
and integrity of the data stored and transmitted within the
non-safety systems. 
Security control devices for monitoring and logging
are not currently avaliable in the nuclear domain. Host-
based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) required in RG
5.71 may cause an adverse impact on the system function.
In this case, HIDS specially developed for NPP I&C systems
not affecting system function or network-based intrusion
detection systems (NIDS) can be candidates for monitoring
and logging. All the IDS in local CDAs or networks may
be integrated to provide plant-wide security monitoring,
logging, and alarming services. This addition of security
control devices will be followed by additional cyber security
risk assessments. They will be treated as separate systems
located in the same defensive architecture of the I&C
systems with suitably assigned security levels. They may
need to apply security control requirements such as those
for access controls and encryption. 
Based on the above discussion, technical control require-
ments are collected for the sample PPS., Table 10 shows
the list of technical security control requirements for the
sample PPS, collected from the classified RG 5.71 require-
ments in Table 9, according to the refined attack vector
analysis in Fig. 7. If the configuration of other safety I&C
systems in NPPs is considered, this table can be applied
extensively to the safety systems. Table 10 also includes
the technical security control requirements that should be
addressed commonly in the design and development of
I&C systems. Fig. 8 shows the application of technical
security control requirements to the sample PPS.
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Table 10. Technical Security Control Requirements for the Sample PPS Identified with the Elements of Refined Attack Vectors
User to CDA
(Access Control)
• Audit Reduction and Report Generation
• Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
• Auditable Events
• Authenticator Feedback
• Identification and Authentication Policies and Procedures
• Information Input Restrictions
• Nonauthenticated Human Machine Interaction Security
• Password Requirements
• Previous Logon Notification
• Session Authenticity
• Session Lock
• Unsuccessful Login Attempts
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Error Handling
• Information Input Restrictions
• System Use Notification
(Encryption)
• CDA Backups 
• Confidentiality of Information at Rest
(Access Control)
• Account Management
• Authenticator Feedback
• Device Identification and Authentication
• Identification and Authentication Policies and Procedures
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Previous Logon Notification
• Session Authenticity
• Session Lock
• Unsuccessful Login Attempts
• Use of External Systems
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Auditable Events
• Error Handling
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Malicious Code Protection
• Mobile Code
• System Use Notification
(Access Control)
• Access Control Policy and Procedures
• Account Management
• Authenticator Feedback
• Identification and Authentication Policies and Procedures
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Password Requirements
• Previous Logon Notification
• Trusted Path
• Unsuccessful Login Attempts
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Audit Reduction and Report Generation
• Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
• Audit Storage Capacity
• Auditable Events
• Content of Audit Records
• Error Handling
• Information Input Restrictions
• Maintenance Tools
• Malicious Code Protection
• Mobile Code
• Response to Audit Processing Failures
• System Use Notification
(Encryption)
• CDA Backups 
(Access Control)
• Access Control Policy and Procedures
• Account Management
• Identification and Authentication Policies and Procedures
• Information Input Restrictions
• Password Requirements
• Previous Logon Notification
• Trusted Path
• Unsuccessful Login Attempts
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Audit Reduction and Report Generation
• Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
• Audit Storage Capacity
• Auditable Events
• Content of Audit Records
• Error Handling
• Maintenance Tools
• Malicious Code Protection
• Mobile Code
• Response to Audit Processing Failures
• System Use Notification
(Encryption)
• CDA Backups
External Device(Authenticatable) to CDA
External Media to CDA External Media to External Devices (Authenticatable)
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Table 10. Technical Security Control Requirements for the Sample PPS Identified with the Elements of Refined Attack Vectors
External Devices (Non-Authenticatable) to CDA
External Media to External Devices (Non-Authenticatable)
(Access Control)
• Device Identification and Authentication
• Maintenance Tools
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Maintenance Tools
• System Use Notification
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Maintenance Tools
• System Use Notification
(Access Control)
• Defense_in_Depth
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Auditable Events
• Defense_in_Depth
• Denial of Service Protection
• Host Intrusion Detection System
• Information Flow Enforcement
• Proprietary Protocol Visibility
• Response to Audit Processing Failures
• Secure Name/Address Resolution Service
(Authoritative/Trusted Source)
(Encryption)
• Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management
• Cryptographic Module Authentication
• Information Flow Enforcement
• Transmission Integrity
(Others)
• Insecure and Rogue Connections
• Network Access Control
• “Open/Insecure” Protocol Restrictions
(Access Control)
• Access Control Policy and Procedures
• Account Management
• Authenticator Feedback
• Identification and Authentication Policies and Procedures
• Password Requirements
• Previous Logon Notification
• Session Authenticity
• Session Lock
• User Identification and Authentication
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Auditable Events
• Error Handling
• Information Input Restrictions
• System Use Notification
(Access Control)
• Application Partitioning and Security Function Isolation
• Hardware Configuration
• Unauthorized Remote Activation of Services
(Monitoring & Logging)
• Developer Security Testing
• Fail in Known State
• Hardware Configuration
• Monitoring Tools and Techniques
• Protection of Audit Information
• Removal of Unnecessary Services and Programs
Other CDA to CDA (including Networks)
User to External Devices (Authenticatable) Additional items
Fig. 8. Example Application of Technical Security Control Requirements to the PPS
4. CONCLUSION
Due to the digitalization of NPP I&C systems, cyber
security has become an important issue. The RG 5.71
published by the U.S. NRC provides guidance for the cyber
security of I&C systems, including cyber security plans and
programs, methods for cyber security assessments, and a
comprehensive set of security controls. There are still diffi-
culties, from the system designer’s point of view, when
trying to apply the requirements to target systems.
In order to provide helpful information for system
designers in the application of cyber security requirements
to systems, this paper describes methods and considerations
to define attack vectors in a target system, to review and
select the requirements in RG 5.71, and to integrate the
results from these activities to identify applicable technical
security controls according to the attack vectors. 
The attack vector analyses are performed in a process
consisting of the following activities: 1) Analysis of an
I&C system architecture at the highest conceptual level;
2) Modeling of a target system in cyber security point of
view; 3) Security level assignments to the CDAs of a target
system; 4) Analysis of the elements of attack vectors; 5)
Investigation of the known vulnerabilities residing in the
CDAs and penetration tests to identify potential malicious
activities. 
The RG 5.71 provides the most complete set of require-
ments for the cyber security of NPP I&C systems. Among
the security control requirements listed in Appendices B
and C of RG 5.71, those that should be implemented into
the systems are selected and classified in groups of technical
security control requirements using the results from the
attack vector analyses. For the attack vector elements of
CDAs, all the requirements in the groups of technical
security controls are evaluated in their applicability and
effectiveness, and considerations in this evaluation are
also discussed. 
The methods proposed in this paper are practiced with
a sample PPS system, and the technical security control
requirements grouped according to the elements of attack
vectors are presented as a result.
In conclusion, the proposed methods provide useful
and practical information for NPP I&C system designers
for the identification of appropriate technical security
controls and their locations in the systems. Further studies
are needed to search detailed practices of those control
requirements, and to develop security devices and technolo-
gies best fitted to NPP I&C systems.
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